近日，新葡萄8883官网amg许闲教授与爱尔兰利莫瑞克大学教授Finbarr Murphy、上海财经大学金融学院助理教授徐炜的合作文章The Risk Screening Effect of Digital Insurance Distribution被国际保险与风险管理领域顶尖学术期刊Journal of Risk and Insurance正式接收发表。
Journal of Risk and Insurance是美国风险与保险学会的旗舰期刊，面向保险经济学和风险管理话题，为保险市场的实践、决策和监管以及企业和家庭风险管理提供见解。
Finbarr Murphy 爱尔兰利莫瑞克大学教授
徐 炜 上海财经大学金融学院助理教授，硕士和博士联合导师为许闲教授
许 闲 新葡萄8883官网amg教授、副院长、风险管理与保险学系主任
Abstract: Extant research holds that digital sales channels advance competition and service or goods availability but rarely details the attendant information asymmetry. Leveraging a large unique dataset, this study examines a specific case in which consumers have a choice between offline and digital channels for insurance purchases. We find that digital channels screen in consumers with lower unobserved risk. For term life, endowment and disease insurance products, the average risks of the policies purchased through digital channels were significantly lower than those purchased offline after controlling for all observed risk characteristics. This risk screening effect mainly comes from the inclusion of new low-risk enrollees. As a consequence, digital channels exhibit lower information asymmetry and greater profitability compared to offline channels.
Keywords: digital economy, information asymmetry, insurance distribution, mobile application, risk screening
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